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I. INTRODUCTION 
The legal and regulatory environment in New Jersey must be 
changed to encourage price competition1 among residential real es-
tate brokers,2 which will in turn lower transaction costs for both buy-
ers and sellers.  Alternative brokerages, such as those with discount, 
flat-fee, or fee-for-service business models, are the key to driving in-
creased price competition among the state’s traditional brokerages.3  
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 1 Professor Deardorff defines price competition as “[c]ompetition among firms 
by reducing price, as opposed to by changing characteristics of the product.”  ALAN 
V. DEARDORFF, TERMS OF TRADE: GLOSSARY OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 214 (2006), 
available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~alandear/glossary/p.html.  In that re-
gard, when this Comment refers to price competition, it is referring to the price of 
brokers’ commissions. 
 2 “Real estate brokers are licensed professionals who help sellers and prospective 
buyers of homes, and are often part of a brokerage firm or franchise.”  Press Release, 
Fed. Trade Comm’n, Buying a Home: It’s a Big Deal (May 2007), available at 
http://ftc.gov/bc/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/zalt001.pdf; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
45:15-3 (West Supp. 2007) (New Jersey’s definition of a real estate broker). 
 3 FED. TRADE COMM’N & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION IN THE REAL ESTATE 
BROKERAGE INDUSTRY 37 (2007), available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/realestate 
/V050015.pdf [hereinafter FTC/DOJ] (“Some commenters identified discount and 
fee-for-service brokers as key drivers of price competition.  One agent claimed that, 
due to the prevalence of discount brokers, real estate agents ‘are confronted with the 
question how much can you reduce your commission?  It is a standard question 
now.’”). 
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New Jersey’s rebate ban4 makes it difficult for these alternative bro-
kerages5 to enter and succeed in the state’s market.  This law, along 
with a lack of proactive state action to combat the anticompetitive 
practice of “steering,”6 has created a legal and regulatory framework 
that disfavors alternative brokerages, and thereby reduces price com-
petition while increasing transaction costs for the consumer.7 
This Comment does not seek to explore what brokers should 
earn based upon services provided, but rather stands for the proposi-
tion that price competition is in the public’s best interest.  To en-
courage price competition, alternative business models should be al-
lowed to compete vigorously within New Jersey without having to face 
unnecessary statutory constraints and enforcement problems that 
limit their ability to survive.   
New Jersey’s courts have long recognized a public trust8 placed 
in residential real estate brokers (brokers).  These decisions show 
that the courts view the residential real estate industry as being “af-
fected with a public interest”9 in which brokers are held to higher du-
 4 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-17(k) (West Supp. 2007) (preventing brokers from re-
bating a portion of their commission to the buyer or seller). 
 5 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) defines alternative brokerages as “those 
brokerage firms whose business practices differ substantially from the norm in either 
commission rate or in type, level, or variety of service offered.”  FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
STAFF REPORTS, THE RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY: LOS ANGELES 
REGIONAL OFFICE STAFF REPORT VOLUMES I AND II AND THE BUTTERS REPORT 20 (1983), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/realestate/workshop/index.htm (scroll to bottom 
of webpage, and then use hyperlinks to access PDF versions of the report) [hereinaf-
ter FTC 1983]. 
 6 For a definition of steering, see FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 68 (“Steering refers 
to any action taken by a broker or agent to avoid cooperating with a particular com-
petitor.”).  The form of steering discussed in this Comment is based on economic 
and competitive factors, as opposed to the racial steering discussed in Havens Realty 
Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). 
 7 See generally Norman W. Hawker, Competition in the Residential Real Estate 
Brokerage Industry: A Summary of the AAI Symposium (Fall 2006), 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/archives/files/535.pdf. 
 8 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (“There can be 
no doubt that the business of the real estate broker is affected with a public interest.  
The Legislature has marked it off as distinct from occupations which are pursued of 
common right without regulation or restriction.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis 
added); Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Servs., Inc. v. N.J. Real Estate 
Comm’n, 576 A.2d 938, 941 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (“The occupation of a 
real estate broker is permeated by considerations of public policy.”) (emphasis added); 
Grillo v. Bd. of REALTORS of the Plainfield Area, 219 A.2d 635, 643 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Ch. Div. 1966) (“[I]n addition to the public concern with monopolistic practices, 
there is a specific public interest in the real estate business—shown by the scheme of 
regulation provided by statute . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 9 Ellsworth Dobbs, 236 A.2d at 856. 
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ties as fiduciaries.10  Better enforcement is needed to ensure that bro-
kers fulfill those fiduciary duties, namely by putting the interests of 
their clients above their own. 
New Jersey courts have also shown that they value competition 
among brokers.11  In Grillo v. Board of REALTORS of the Plainfield Area, 
the Superior Court found that the best form of competition involves 
a variety of competitors: “It has been recognized that effective or 
workable competition requires ‘the presence in the market of several 
sellers, each of them possessing the capacity to survive and grow, and 
the preservation of conditions which keep alive the threat of poten-
tial competition from others.’”12 
The Grillo court’s logic is also shared by economists, regulators, 
and interest groups who expound the benefits of a market containing 
many different competing brokers with diverse business models.13  
 10 Id. (“The broker was and is looked upon as a fiduciary and is required to exer-
cise fidelity, good faith and primary devotion to the interests of his principal.”) (citation 
omitted) (emphasis added). 
 11 The concept of competition as a public good is seen in the Grillo and Oates de-
cisions: “It is the policy of the common law to encourage competition.” Grillo, 219 
A.2d at 644 (citation omitted).  “The lessening of competition—a public evil—is in-
controvertibly present.”  Oates v. E. Bergen County Multiple Listing Serv., Inc., 273 
A.2d 795, 803 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1971). 
 12 Grillo, 219 A.2d at 647 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 13 “From an economist’s perspective, the more different types of folks who might 
get to share [real estate] listings, the more likely it is that the consumers are likely to 
be presented with a wide array of choices.”  Dr. Robert Hahn, Executive Dir. of the 
Am. Enter. Inst.-Brookings Joint Ctr., Statement at Competition Policy and the Real 
Estate Industry: A Public Workshop Hosted by the Federal Trade Commission and 
Department of Justice 32 (2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/ 
comprealestate/051209transcript.pdf [hereinafter Workshop]. “It’s a complicated 
market . . . but that’s all the more reason to have different competitive models out 
there and different kinds of services being offered to the consumer.”  Id. at 49. 
The Progressive Policy Institute, a Washington think tank, has esti-
mated that these newer internet-based business models could save con-
sumers close to half of that $60 billion currently spent on real estate 
commissions. If that’s true, or if it’s even partially true, that would rep-
resent a huge savings obviously to consumers. 
Id. at 136 (Jon Leibowitz, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Statement). Regarding 
those consumers who wish to pay less in exchange for limited services: 
     New business models offering unbundled real estate services have 
been created to fill this demand.  In areas where barriers to this busi-
ness model have not been created consumers who are experienced in 
real estate transactions . . . as well as other consumers who take the 
time to understand the process, have saved substantial amounts on real 
estate sales transactions. 
     . . . . 
     [A]HGA believes that were there no barriers to new business models 
their penetration would be much greater and the average commission 
today would be much lower. 
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Based upon these principles, New Jersey must change its statutory 
and regulatory structure and the methods by which those laws and 
rules are enforced to give alternative brokerages the “capacity to sur-
vive and grow,” and to help create the “conditions which keep alive 
the threat of potential competition from others.”14  By doing so, the 
state can put price pressures on traditional brokerages and reduce 
transaction costs for New Jersey’s buyers and sellers. 
In an effort to spur effective legal and regulatory change, in Part 
II this Comment provides a background of the current state of New 
Jersey’s residential real estate market.  This involves analyzing the 
various brokerage business models already present in the state and 
the business models of those brokerages that are prevented from en-
tering New Jersey because of its rebate ban.  Part II also describes the 
general lack of price competition in the residential real estate indus-
try.  In Part III, this Comment supports A373, an Assembly bill aimed 
at repealing New Jersey’s rebate ban.15  Part III discusses the argu-
ments both for and against rebates, New Jersey’s rationale for its re-
bate ban, and why the ban must be repealed.  Finally, in Part IV this 
Comment suggests a framework to combat steering.  Part IV discusses 
the legal and ethical problems with steering, along with the code and 
enforcement changes that the state should make to reduce the effects 
of steering while fostering increased price competition among resi-
dential brokers.16 
II. THE GROWTH OF ALTERNATIVE BROKERAGES IN NEW JERSEY MUST 
BE PROMOTED TO COMBAT THE GENERAL LACK OF PRICE COMPETITION  
New Jersey has many different kinds of brokerages present in the 
state and many which have yet to enter. There are four major varie-
ties of brokers in New Jersey: traditional, full service discount, flat-fee 
Multiple Listing Service (MLS)17 access, and fee-for-service.  Some of 
Comments of the American Homeowners Grassroots Alliance, submitted to the U.S. 
Fed. Trade Comm’n and the U.S. Dep’t of Justice for the Public Workshop on Com-
petition Policy and the Real Estate Indus. (Oct. 25, 2005), available at http://www. 
americanhomeowners.org/AHGA/DoJ-FTC10-25-05.htm [hereinafter AHGA]. 
 14 Grillo, 219 A.2d at 647 (citation omitted). 
 15 Gen. Assem. 373, 213th Leg., 2008–2009 Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2008) (A373 was first 
introduced in the 2006–2007 legislative session as A3567). 
 16 The analysis within this Comment is meant to apply statewide, despite the dif-
ferences in closing procedures in northern and southern New Jersey.  Also, the ques-
tion of what constitutes a fair wage for a broker’s services is beyond the scope of this 
Comment. 
 17 For a description of the MLS, see Grillo, 219 A.2d at 644.  See also AHGA, supra 
note 13 (“The MLS is an electronic database of information about the homes of the 
fiduciaries of participating brokers.  Most [MLS databases] are owned and governed 
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the firms not currently operating within the state employ a rebate-
based business model. The New Jersey market is rich in real estate 
professionals.  According to the New Jersey Real Estate Commission 
(NJREC),18 as of July 31, 2006, there were 88,126 real estate salesper-
sons, 7940 broker salespersons, and 3743 brokers of record in the 
state.19  Over 57,000 of those agents are members of the New Jersey 
Association of REALTORS® (NJAR®),20 a trade organization which 
falls under the auspices of the National Association of REALTORS® 
(NAR®).21 
A. Alternative Brokerages in New Jersey 
A key to price competition in the residential real estate industry 
is the growth and survival of alternative brokerages.22  This Comment 
focuses on three of the business models employed by New Jersey’s al-
ternative brokerages: full-service discount, flat-fee MLS access, and 
fee-for-service.  Changes are needed to allow alternatives brokerages 
to better compete in New Jersey and to encourage those not yet in 
the state to enter the market. 
Before delving into the alternative brokerage industry, it is im-
portant to understand the role of “traditional” brokers.  Traditional 
brokerages dominate the marketplace across the country.23  Tradi-
by those brokers . . . [M]ost MLS’s [sic] now also feed partial MLS listing information 
to the consumer-facing websites of participating brokers.”). 
 18 NJ Real Estate Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_rec/index. 
htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (stating that the NJREC was formed to “administer 
and enforce” the state’s real estate licensing law, issue licenses, and establish “stan-
dards of practice” for the profession). 
 19 NJ Real Estate Commission: Licensing and Education, 
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_rec/licensing/reclic_menu.htm (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2008). 
 20 NJAR® Press Kit, Frequently Asked Questions, 
http://www.njar.com/pressroom/presskit/FAQs.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); see 
generally New Jersey Association of REALTORS®, http://www.njar.com (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2008). 
 21 NAR®, http://www.realtor.org (last visited Dec. 30, 2007); see generally About 
REALTORS®, http://www.realtor.org/realtororg.nsf/pages/AboutREALTORS?Op 
enDocument (last visited Nov. 1, 2008) (the REALTOR® designation is given to bro-
kers who are members of NAR and follow its Code of Ethics). 
 22 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 37.  For a definition of alternative brokerages, see 
FTC 1983, supra note 5. 
 23 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, REPORT TO THE H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 
H. R., REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE, FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT PRICE COMPETITION 12 n.21 
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05947.pdf [hereinafter GAO] 
(“Consultants to NAR estimated that discount, full-service brokerages, Internet-
oriented full-service brokerages, broker referral services, and other nontraditional 
brokerage models collectively represented buyers and sellers in less than 2 percent of 
all real estate brokerage transactions in 2003.”). 
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tional brokers are those who charge the “going rate” for commis-
sion24 and offer a full range of services.25  Some examples of tradi-
tional brokerages in New Jersey are Prudential Real Estate, Coldwell 
Banker Real Estate LLC, Weichert Realtors®, Diane Turton Real-
tors®, The Mary Holder Agency, GMAC Real Estate, Sotheby’s Inter-
national Realty,26 and hoards of independent br
The first variety of alternative brokerages is the full-service dis-
count firms which compete on price by offering full service at a re-
duced commission.28  In New Jersey, a few brokerages utilize different 
variations of the full-service discount model, including Assist-2-Sell29 
 24 See id. at 10 (average commission rates stand at approximately 5.1%). 
 25 Those services include, on the seller side, helping to determine the appropri-
ate list price for the home, placing the listing in MLS, advertising the home, offering 
open houses, showing the home and arranging appointments for other brokers to 
show the home, procuring offers and aiding in the negotiation process, and helping 
to get the deal to closing.  PATRICK WOODALL & STEPHEN BROBECK, CONSUMER FED’N 
OF AM., NONTRADITIONAL REAL ESTATE BROKERS: GROWTH AND CHALLENGES 3 (2006), 
available at http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Nontraditonal_Real_Estate_Brokers-
Growth_and_Challenges.pdf.  On the buyer side, the traditional broker helps the 
buyer select which properties are appropriate for the buyer based upon price and 
features, shows the properties, drafts the contract, negotiates the sale price, and as-
sists the buyer in getting the deal to closing by recommending inspectors.  Id.; see 
William C. Erxleben, In Search of Price and Service Competition in Residential Real Estate 
Brokerage: Breaking the Cartel, 56 WASH. L. REV. 179, 182 (1981); Lawrence J. White, The 
Residential Real Estate Brokerage Industry: What Would More Vigorous Competition Look 
Like?, 35 REAL EST. L.J. 11, 13 n.6 (2006). 
 26 Find Real Estate, http://www.prudentialproperties.com (last visited Nov. 1, 
2008); Coldwell Banker Real Estate LLC, http://www.coldwellbanker.com (last vis-
ited Nov. 1, 2008); Weichert.com, http://www.weichert.com (last visited Nov. 1, 
2008); Welcome to Your New Jersey Florida Real Estate Connection, 
http://www.dianeturton.com/customization/dtr/newsite (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); 
A Tradition of Success, http://www.maryholder.com/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2007); 
GMAC Real Estate, http://www.gmacrealestate.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2008); 
Luxury Real Estate & Homes for Sale, http://www.sothebysrealty.com (last visited 
Nov. 1, 2008). 
 27 In one small Monmouth County town alone—Atlantic Highlands—as recently 
as late 2008 there were four independent brokerages (Britton Real Estate LLC, 
Lesher Associates, Maddalena Realty LLC, and Raymond Passaro Realtors®).  The 
economic slow-down has caused that number to dwindle to two in 2009. 
 28 GAO, supra note 23, at 5. 
 29 Assist-2-Sell is a discount/fee-for-service hybrid with six New Jersey offices. As-
sist-2-Sell, http://www.assist2sell.com/Default.aspx (follow “Find an Office” hyper-
link; click on “NJ” icon) (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  It offers a menu of service pro-
grams with a sliding scale for commissions.  Information for Home Sellers, 
http://www.assist2sell.com/Default.aspx (follow “Find an Office” hyperlink; click on 
“Selling a Home”) (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  These services include a paperwork 
only “flat fee” fee-for-service component where no listing contract is required, a “Di-
rect to Buyers” office-exclusive program, and their discounted full-service package, 
“MLS for less.”  Id. 
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and Cara Realtors®.30  Foxtons—a former giant in the New Jersey full-
service discount market31—recently declared bankruptcy,32 leaving a 
large void in this segment of the industry. 
Next, the flat-fee business model, in which sellers are charged a 
small flat-fee for access into the MLS system, provides a minimum 
level of services, such as compiling a listing, taking pictures of the 
home, and providing a lockbox and flyers.33  Examples of flat-fee MLS 
access firms operating in New Jersey are Realmart Realty,34 ForSale-
ByOwner.com, and Fsbonj.com.35 
Another popular alternative brokerage business model in New 
Jersey is fee-for-service.  These brokerages compete on price by offer-
ing an à la carte menu of services.36  Fees are thus based on services 
 30 Cara Realtors® offers full service listings at 3.9%.  Cara Realtors, http://www. 
cararealtors.com/aboutus.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  It is an independent bro-
kerage with one office in Point Pleasant Beach.  Cara Realtors—Point Pleasant Beach 
NJ Real Estate, http://www.cararealtors.com/contactUs.html (last visited Nov. 5, 
2008). 
 31 Foxtons was a full service discount firm that offered to list properties at com-
missions as low as two percent.  James T. Prior, Cohen’s yhd Foxtons Offers Realty Reality, 
BNET, Dec. 1, 2002, available at http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5311/is_ 
200212/ai_n21321492.  Its North American corporate headquarters was located in 
West Long Branch.  Id.  Foxton’s agents were on salary rather than paid via commis-
sion, and they had an extensive support staff to handle different aspects of the trans-
action.  Id. 
 32 Michael L. Diamond, Foxtons’ Debts Top $40 Million, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Nep-
tune, N.J.), Oct. 9, 2007, at A1. 
 33 Get Your Flat Fee MLS Real Estate Listing in New Jersey (NJ) with no listing 
commission, http://www.flatfeemlsdirect.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 34 Realmart Realty, the local agent for flatfeemlsdirect.com, offers a $395 flat-fee 
MLS listing.  Id.  The seller may also pay $495 for a “showcase” listing.  Id.  The seller 
receives an MLS listing, photos of the home, a lockbox, forms, yard signs, and house 
flyers.  Flat Fee MLS NJ, http://www.flatfeemlsdirect.com/selling_plans.htm (last vis-
ited Nov. 5, 2008).  The seller takes all calls for availability, appointments, and ques-
tions.  FAQ about MLS listing, FSBO, selling and buying agents, 
http://www.flatfeemlsdirect.com/faq.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  The listing 
agent reviews the contract.  Id.  The flat fee goes to Realmart and the seller pays a 
normal commission to the cooperating broker (generally two to three percent of the 
sale price).  Id.  According to their broker, Realmart Realty averages 200 listings per 
month, and often times the owners of these properties are sales associates from tradi-
tional brokerages looking to save on commission.  Telephone Interview with Gary 
Ragusa, Broker/Owner, Realmart Realty, in Highlands, N.J. (Aug. 10, 2007) [herein-
after Ragusa Interview]. 
 35 FSBO: For Sale By Owner-FAQs, http://www.forsalebyowner.com/help.html? 
clickID=topNav (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); FSBONJ.com-For Sale By Owner NJ, 
http://www.fsbonj.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 36 Workshop, supra note 13, at 8–9 (Deborah Platt Majoras, Chairman of the Fed. 
Trade Comm’n, Statement); see GAO, supra note 23, at 5; Erin Johansen, Help-U-Sell 
Gains Converts, DENV. BUS. J., Apr. 30, 2004, available at http://denver.biz 
journals.com/denver/stories/2004/05/03/newscolumn2.html?page=3 (“This fee-
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provided rather than on a percentage of the sale price.37  Two exam-
ples of fee-for-service brokerages in New Jersey are Help-U-Sell38 and 
Real Estate Consultants.39 
B. Alternative Brokerages Not Present in New Jersey 
Some growing alternative brokerages have yet to enter New Jer-
sey, such as Redfin40 and Buyside Realty.41  Both of these brokerages 
use a rebate-based business model, which involves the broker return-
ing a portion of his commission to the client, resulting in substantial 
cost savings for the buyer or seller.42  Because of the state’s current 
for-service concept is different than discount brokers who simply decrease their 
commission rate but don’t give sellers the option to handle parts of the process on 
their own.”). 
 37 The logic behind this method of pricing is best described in the following 
quote from a broker on the Jersey Shore: 
I ask people “If you were to bring a 10 year old economy car and a 
brand new luxury car to be washed, what do you think you would pay?”  
Well, the same of course because the cost of the wash has nothing to do 
with the value [of] the car.  The same is true in real estate and I just re-
flect that. 
E-mail from Daniel Desmond, Broker/Owner of Help-U-Sell Bay Beach Realty, to 
Bradford W. Muller (Aug. 10, 2007, 05:04 EST) (on file with author). 
 38 Help-U-Sell Real Estate, http://www.helpusell.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  
Help-U-Sell has four New Jersey offices.  Office Locator, http://www.helpusell. 
com/office_locator_map.asp?state=NJ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  It applies fees for 
each individual service that the seller wants, including showing the home and run-
ning an open house.  Help-U-Sell Real Estate: Save The Help-U-Sell Way, 
http://www.helpusell.com/sellers_save.shtml (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); see Johansen, 
supra note 36. 
 39 Real Estate Consultants has multiple New Jersey offices.  Real Estate Consult-
ants in New Jersey, http://www.recnj.com/contact.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  It 
is a fee-for-service brokerage, offering a menu of plans with increasing commissions 
based upon the services provided: 2% Participation Plan, Associate Plan, and MLS 
Plan.  Id. 
 40 Damon Darlin, 2 Web Sites Push Further into Services Real Estate Agents Offer, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 8, 2006 at C3 (“Redfin.com, introduced an unusual new service last week. 
. . . [T]he feature automates the process of bidding on a house online. . . . [T[hen it 
rebates to the buyer two-thirds of the buyer’s agent’s commission . . . .”). 
 41 Buyside Realty, http://www.buysiderealty.com (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  
Buyside Realty offers sixty-six percent commission rebates to their buyers.  Id.  Steve 
Otis, Buyside’s General Counsel, says that this saves the average buyer $11,000.  
Telephone Interview with Steve Otis, General Counsel, Buyside Realty (Sept. 4, 2007) 
[hereinafter Otis Interview]. 
 42 Glenn Kelman, the president and CEO of Redfin noted: 
We’ve refunded over $3 million in commissions to our customers . . . 
[w]hen we’re the buyer’s agent, we take our commission, which is usu-
ally three percent.  We keep one-third of it.  And we give two-thirds of it 
back to the buyer.  So, on a $1 million house, we would get $30,000 
normally.  But we only keep $10,000 and give $20,000 back to the 
buyer. 
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ban on rebates, these brokerages are precluded from entering New 
Jersey without drastically changing their approach.43  Altering their 
respective business models could severely hurt these companies’ abil-
ity to succeed within the state.44 
ZipRealty45—an internet-based real estate brokerage with the 
same basic rebate approach as Redfin and Buyside Realty—has been 
forced to change its business model to comply with New Jersey’s re-
bate ban.  Now instead of offering rebates to New Jersey’s consumers, 
ZipRealty offers to make a donation to the buyer’s charity of choice 
equivalent to twenty percent of their commission.46  The lack of suc-
cess this commission-donation inducement is having as compared to 
a pure buyer-rebate is evidenced by ZipRealty’s ardent support for 
the elimination of New Jersey’s rebate ban.47 
C. Competition in the Residential Real Estate Industry Is Focused on 
Non-Price Dimensions, as Traditional Brokerages Stifle Price 
Competition 
Generally, despite the existence of alternative brokerages, there 
is a lack of price competition48 in the residential real estate industry.49  
CBS News: Chipping Away at Realtors’ Six Percent (CBS television broadcast May 13, 
2007), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/05/11/60minutes/print 
able2790865.shtml. 
 43 Posting of JanelleS to Redfin Real Estate Forums, http://forums.redfin. 
com/rf/board/message?board.id=SiteQuestions&thread.id=57 (Aug. 22, 2007, 15:32 
EST) (“FYI, there are 11 states that do not allow rebates, therefore Redfin cannot set 
up shop with our current business model of rebating 2/3rd of the commission back 
to the buyers[.]”).  Redfin has not yet assessed how it would change its business 
model to conform to New Jersey’s rebate ban should it decide to enter New Jersey.  
E-mail from Cynthia Pang, Senior Communications Manager, Redfin Corporation, to 
Bradford W. Muller (Aug. 30, 2007, 13:27 EST) (on file with author);  see infra note 
44. 
 44 Mr. Otis stated that if Buyside decides to enter New Jersey, it will not be as suc-
cessful in the state because it would have to drastically change its business model to 
conform to the rebate ban.  Otis Interview, supra note 41. 
 45 ZipRealty Real Estate, Homes for Sale, MLS Listings, Real Estate Agents, 
http://www.ziprealty.com/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 46 ZipRealty Real Estate—Buy a home and get 20% of our commission back!, 
http://www.ziprealty.com/buy_a_home/rebate.jsp?donate= (last visited Nov. 5. 
2008). 
 47 At the February 6, 2007, hearing before the NJREC on A3567 (currently 
A373)—the Assembly bill that would repeal New Jersey’s rebate ban—Patrick Lashin-
sky, President of ZipRealty, was the lead presenter and laid out his company’s case 
for allowing rebates.  Presentation by ZipRealty and Discussion on Assembly Bill A-3567: 
Hearing on A-3567 Before the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n of the Dep’t of Banking and Ins. (N.J. 
2007) [hereinafter Presentation]. 
 48 Deardorff, supra note 1. 
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The focus of brokers’ efforts to procure customers instead lies mostly 
in non-price competition.50  Thus, rather than attracting clients by of-
fering lower commissions, and therein reducing consumers’ transac-
tion costs, brokers instead focus on such non-price competition as in-
creased advertising, drawing more agents to the brokerage to 
increase sales volume, offering a larger variety of services, and other 
measures.51  Sometimes, this non-price competition is wasteful, result-
ing in services being offered that consumers do not want or need.52 
A major reason for the focus on non-price competition is that al-
ternative brokerages are often punished by their fellow brokers for at-
tempting to compete on price via reduced commissions.53  Tradi-
tional brokerages levy punishment by disparaging the alternative 
broker, directly soliciting the alternative broker’s current clients, and 
steering their buyers away from the alternative broker’s listings.54  In 
New Jersey, steering from traditional brokers and the rebate ban 
makes running a profitable business difficult for alternative broker-
ages and therefore discourages price competition. 
III. THE REBATE BAN IS A MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO PRICE COMPETITION 
IN NEW JERSEY AND MUST BE REPEALED 
In the majority of states, brokers are allowed to rebate a portion 
of their commission to their clients at closing.55  A rebate lowers 
 49 FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 42 (“While price competition generally is not con-
sidered a useful method of competing in this industry, non-price competition for an 
increased share of the business being done in the market is intense.”). 
 50 Id.; FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 47 (“Hsieh provided empirical evidence at the 
Workshop consistent with competition in the brokerage industry occurring primarily 
in non-price dimensions.”). 
 51 GAO, supra note 23, at 11. 
 52 See GAO, supra note 23, at 11 (“Although some of [the non-price competition] 
can benefit consumers, some economic literature suggest that such actions lead to 
inefficiency because brokerage services could be provided by fewer agents or at a 
lower cost.”); Workshop, supra note 13, at 246 (Dr. Chang-Tai Hsieh, Assoc. Professor 
of Economics at the Univ. of California, Statement) (“[I]t’s clear there’s an enor-
mous amount of competition in the real estate brokerage business, but what we 
should try to do is think of ways in which competition translates into lower prices, 
higher quality of service, not into this kind of waste.”) (emphasis added). 
 53 Michael K. Braswell & Stephen L. Poe, The Residential Real Estate Brokerage Indus-
try: A Proposal for Reform, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 271, 315, 317 (1992). 
 54 Id.; Ragusa Interview, supra note 34 (Mr. Ragusa claims to have been the victim 
of blatant steering and disparaging remarks by fellow brokers). 
 55 DOJ/Antitrust: Rebates Make Buying a Home Less Expensive, 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/real_estate/rebates.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) 
[hereinafter DOJ/Antitrust].  Rebates are currently prohibited in twelve states: 
Alaska, Alabama, Kansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and Tennessee.  Id.  Additionally, “Iowa prohibits 
MULLER (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:20:59 PM 
2009] COMMENT 675 
 
transaction costs and encourages price competition among brokers, 
especially those representing buyers.56  In fact, rebates appear to be 
one of the only viable ways to achieve buyer-side price competition.57  
Therefore, to promote both increased price competition and cost sav-
ings for the state’s consumers, New Jersey’s Legislature must repeal 
its rebate ban. 
A. Both Public and Private Groups Have Presented Strong Arguments 
in Favor of Allowing Rebates 
In a letter to the Speaker of the Tennessee House of Representa-
tives—in an attempt to prevent Tennessee from passing a rebate ban 
similar to New Jersey’s—the Department of Justice (DOJ) outlined its 
argument for allowing rebates: 
The structure of the typical real estate contract makes brokers’ 
freedom to offer rebates important.  As you know, the seller and 
seller’s broker typically agree on the rate of the commission to be 
paid and how the commission is allocated between the seller’s 
and buyer’s brokers.  As a result, there is no opportunity for the 
buyer to negotiate with his or her broker for a lower commission 
rate.... Rebates are important under this typical structure because they of-
ten present the only viable way for a buyer’s broker to compete for business 
on the basis of price.  If the buyer’s broker were simply to reduce his 
or her share of the joint commission, the savings would go di-
rectly to the seller’s broker, not to the home buyer or the home 
seller.  Thus, lowering the commission does not bring the buyer’s 
broker more business or save his customers money.  Rebates, in 
contrast, go directly to the buyer or the seller, and are powerful tools for 
competition among brokers.58 
rebates when the consumers use the services of two or more real estate brokers dur-
ing a transaction.”  Id. 
 56 Workshop, supra note 13, at 155 (Philip Henderson, Vice President of Lending 
Tree, LLC, Statement) (“If a broker wishes to use price competition . . . it’s very diffi-
cult for the buyer side to do that, because the custom in the industry . . . is for the 
seller’s broker to split its commission with the buyer’s broker. . . . but a rebate helps to 
facilitate that price competition . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 57 GAO, supra note 23, at 15 (“Proponents also note that offering a rebate is one 
of the few ways to reduce the effective price of buyer brokerage services since com-
missions are typically paid wholly by the seller.”);  FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 105 
(“Rebating is a form of price competition that is used by a number of alternative 
brokers.  [Rebating] may be the only practicable method by which price competition can reach 
the buyer’s end of the transaction.”) (emphasis added). 
 58 Letter from John R. Read, Chief, Litigation III, U.S. Department of Justice An-
titrust Division, to James O. Naifeh, Speaker of the House, Tennessee House of Rep-
resentatives (May 12, 2007) (emphasis added), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr 
/public/comments/223252.htm. 
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has also been a propo-
nent of rebates, dating back to their heavily cited 1983 report on the 
residential real estate industry.59  The FTC laid out the potential cost 
benefits of allowing rebates in its most recent report.60  As an exam-
ple, the FTC stated that a broker who rebates a third of his commis-
sion to his client creates overall commission savings of approximately 
sixteen percent on the total transaction.61 
The American Antitrust Institute and the now-defunct American 
Enterprise Institute–Brookings Joint Center have been the standard 
bearers among private groups advocating for an end to rebate bans.62  
Meanwhile, even some major traditional brokerages have come out in 
favor of rebates, including Cendant,63 the former parent company of 
Century 21, Coldwell Banker, Coldwell Banker Commercial, ERA and 
Sotheby’s International Realty.64  Another proponent of rebates is 
Prudential Fox & Roach,65 whose Senior Vice President spoke before 
 59 FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 105. 
 60 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 50. 
 61 Id. 
 62 AEI-Brookings Joint Center, http://aei-brookings.org/publications/index. 
php?tab=topics&topicid=83 (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); American Antitrust Institute, 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); see Robert W. Hahn, 
Robert E. Litan & Jesse Gurman, Bringing More Competition To Real Estate Brokerage, 35 
REAL EST. L.J. 86, 107 (2006) (“We see no compelling economic rationale for not al-
lowing rebates as they represent a form of price competition that should improve ef-
ficiency by putting pressure on brokerages to provide better services at lower 
prices.”); Hawker, supra note 7, at 18 (“[Commenters] note that commission rebates 
to consumers ‘have a positive impact on consumer welfare.’  Even if ‘higher commis-
sions are necessary to ensure the quality of service most customers want; this result, 
however, should be determined by consumers and producers via the market,’ rather 
than by state laws and regulations.”). 
 63 Workshop, supra note 13, at 151 (Alex Perriello, President and Chief Executive 
Officer of Cendant Real Estate Franchise Group of Cendant Corp., Statement) 
(“[S]ome states prohibit all forms of inducement by real estate licensees. . . . Simply 
put, we feel that those prohibitions on inducements are not necessary.  The remain-
ing anti-inducement states should remove those antiquated laws . . . and stop denying 
businesses the opportunity to offer rebates or inducements.”). 
 64 “These [Cendant] brands have more than 14,400 franchise and company-
owned offices and 303,000 brokers and agents worldwide.”  Id. at 142 (Lee Quinn, 
Attorney with the Antitrust Division, Dep’t of Justice, Statement).  Cendant Real Es-
tate is now a company called “Realogy”.  Cendant: Main, http://www.cendant.com/ 
(last visited Mar. 16, 2009). 
 65 Prudential Fox & Roach is a traditional real estate brokerage, with offices in 
Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Delaware.  Find a Real Estate Agent or Broker at Pru-
dential Fox & Roach Real Estate, http://www.prufoxroach.com/agentoffice/ 
index.cfm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  In total, the company has sixty-five offices and 
over 4000 sales agents.  Sam Ali, Real Estate Bait: Industry Insiders, Legislature Review 
Ban on Closing Gifts, STAR LEDGER (Newark, N.J.), July 15, 2007, at 1 available at 
http://www.njar.com/pressroom/pdf/inthenews/071507.pdf. 
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the NJREC at an April 24, 2007, hearing in favor of a bill that would 
repeal New Jersey’s rebate ban.66  Finally, NAR—in its Code of Ethics 
and Standards of Practice—does not call the use of rebates unethi-
cal.67 
B. Arguments Against Rebates Are Based on an Outdated 
Paternalistic Approach to Consumer Protection 
Despite the clear consumer benefit offered by rebates, a minor-
ity of states disallow them,68 including New Jersey.69  The initial ra-
tionale behind most rebate bans was grounded in consumer protec-
tion, as states hoped to “avoid conflicts of interest between agents and 
customers by preventing brokers from giving a share of their commis-
sion to lawyers, title companies, or others involved in the real estate 
transaction.”70  Proponents now argue for a paternalistic approach, 
saying that consumers should not be allowed to receive rebates be-
cause lifting the bans would expose buyers and sellers to such evils as 
“false and misleading offers of rebates” and would undermine their 
ability to “choose brokers on the basis of quality of service rather than 
price.”71 
One organization that has long supported New Jersey’s rebate 
ban, and has only recently become more amenable to the idea of re-
bates, is NJAR®.72  The arguments provided by NJAR®’s Vice Presi-
dent of Government Affairs are typical of those who advocate against 
rebates: 
[W]e consider them to be distracting gimmickry . . . . The con-
sumer’s focus will not be on the choice of the firm providing the 
real estate brokerage services that best fit the needs of the con-
sumer.  The focus will be on who is offering the best rebate . . . . 
 66 Minutes of the meeting of the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Presentation and Discussion of 
New Jersey Association of Realtors/United States Department of Justice/Zip Realty regarding As-
sembly Bill A3567-Rebate of Commissions 2 (N.J. 2007) [hereinafter April 2007 Minutes]. 
 67 CODE OF ETHICS AND STANDARDS OF PRACTICE OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF 
REALTORS® Standard of Practice 12-3 (2008), available at http://www.realtor.org/ 
mempolweb.nsf/pages/printable2008Code (“The offering of premiums, prizes, 
merchandise discounts or other inducements . . . is not, in itself, unethical . . . The 
offering of any inducements to do business is subject to the limitations and restric-
tions of state law[.]”) [hereinafter CODE OF ETHICS].  
 68 DOJ/Antitrust, supra note 55. 
 69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-17(k) (West Supp. 2007). 
 70 GAO, supra note 23, at 15 n.30; see Mariwyn Evans, Share the Wealth, REALTOR, 
Jan. 1, 2006, available at http://www.realtor.org/rmomag.nsf/pages/lawjan06 (not-
ing that in many states, the intent of the rebate bans was not to stifle price competi-
tion, but rather “to prevent kickbacks in real estate transactions”). 
 71 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 52–53. 
 72 April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66, at 2. 
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NJAR believes consumers should be selecting a real estate profes-
sional based on his or her qualifications, services and rapport—
not whether he or she is offering any type of inducements . . .  
The focus of the home buying process should be on buying a 
home.73 
The Appellate Division explored the rationale behind the state’s 
rebate ban in Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate Services, Inc. v. New 
Jersey Real Estate Commission.74  At the time of Coldwell Banker, the 
NJREC had interpreted the rebate ban to prohibit brokers from giv-
ing clients rebates through department store coupons or discounted 
airline tickets.75  The NJREC’s reasoning for the interpretation was 
that these “gimmicks distracted the parties to real estate transactions 
from the essentials of the transaction, from what they should be fo-
cusing on with respect to the quality of the brokerage service they are 
going to receive as opposed to any add-ons or pre-offerings.”76  The 
Coldwell Banker court upheld that rationale.77 
The Coldwell Banker decision is less persuasive today because it 
predated the DOJ’s recent initiative to combat rebate bans.78  Also, its 
 73 Ali, supra note 65.  For similar arguments from NJAR®, see Glenn Roberts Jr., 
Realtor Group Says No to Consumer Rebates, INMAN NEWS, April 16, 2008, available at http: 
//www.inman.com/news/2008/04/16/realtor-group-says-no-consumer-rebates. 
 74 576 A.2d 938 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990).  Although the court did not 
reach the question of whether the coupons violated the rebate ban, instead invalidat-
ing them based on section 45:15-17(g) of the New Jersey Statute, it did support the 
rationale behind the Commission’s claim that the coupons violated the rebate ban.  
Id. at 941; N.J. STAT. ANN § 45:15-17(g) (West Supp. 2007). 
 75 Presentation, supra note 47, at 52–53 (statement of Robert Melillo, NJREC 
Comm’r). 
 76 Id. 
As the Commission said; “[u]nsophisticated sellers or buyers or relocat-
ing buyers unfamiliar with real estate brokers in a particular area might 
choose a Coldwell Banker office based on the [inducement].” 
     . . . . 
     Finally, the Commission found that the programs operate ‘as an ex-
traneous inducement to consumers’ to buy or sell through [Coldwell 
Banker] for reasons other than the quality of the professional services 
of the broker. 
Coldwell Banker, 576 A.2d at 940. 
 77 Coldwell Banker, 576 A.2d at 941 (“Distracting gimmickry creates dangers which 
are the legitimate concern of the Legislature and the Commission. . . . Extraneous 
inducements . . . can take the buyers’ or sellers’ eyes off the ball.”). 
 78 See infra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.  The DOJ’s Antitrust Division 
finds arguments about the potentially harmful effects of rebates unpersuasive: “Some 
have argued that refunds and incentives can tempt consumers into closing on real es-
tate transactions against their best interests. The Antitrust Division has found no evi-
dence that refunds and incentives harm consumers. On the contrary, they can dra-
matically lower the price that consumers pay for brokerage services.”  DOJ/Antitrust, 
supra note 55. 
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reasoning rings hollow when discussing cash rebates, which simply 
are “a form of providing the buyer with the same opportunity for a 
discounted service that the seller now has in New Jersey.”79  Finally, 
both NJAR®’s position and that of the Coldwell Banker court are based 
on the false assumption that consumers are unsophisticated, easily 
distracted, and unable to make intelligent decisions when faced with 
brokerages competing on price. 
C. Federal Action Will Be Ineffective in Bringing Rebates to New 
Jersey’s Consumers Because of the State Action Immunity Doctrine 
The FTC and DOJ have challenged states with rebate bans.  The 
DOJ has scrutinized and occasionally challenged those limitations 
laid down by state real estate commissions, rather than by legislatures, 
to “bring the benefits of price competition to consumers.”80  Success-
ful efforts have been mounted in South Dakota, West Virginia, and 
Kentucky.81  However, because the New Jersey rebate ban was insti-
tuted by the Legislature, it is likely to be “immune from federal anti-
trust enforcement” because of the state action immunity doctrine.82  
 79 Presentation, supra note 47, at 53 (Dennis Casale, Attorney for ZipRealty, State-
ment). 
 80 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 50. 
 81 Id. at 51 (“DOJ also investigated rebate bans by the South Dakota Real Estate 
Commission, the West Virginia Real Estate Commission, and the Tennessee Real  
Estate Commission.  In response to these investigations, the South Dakota and West 
Virginia Real Estate Commissions rescinded their regulations prohibiting rebates 
. . . .”).  In 2005, the DOJ filed an antitrust suit against Kentucky’s Real Estate Com-
mission (KREC) for restricting competition and “caus[ing] consumers to pay higher 
prices for real estate brokerage services” as a result of its rebate ban.  Id. at 50–51.  
The lawsuit was settled a few months later, with the KREC agreeing not to enforce its 
rebate ban.  Id. 
 82 Id at 50.  For an analysis of the state action immunity doctrine, see FTC OFFICE 
OF POLICY PLANNING, REPORT OF THE STATE ACTION TASK FORCE 1 (Sept. 2003), avail-
able at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/stateactionreport.pdf. 
The state action doctrine—first articulated in Parker v. Brown—shields 
certain anticompetitive conduct from federal antitrust scrutiny when 
the conduct is: (1) in furtherance of a clearly articulated state policy, 
and (2) actively supervised by the state. . . . Because the state action 
doctrine rests on principles of federalism, the doctrine shields sover-
eign activities of the State itself, including the actions of a state legisla-
ture, a governor, or a state supreme court, provided that these entities 
are acting in their sovereign capacity under the state constitution.  The 
doctrine also extends to other, lower level entities—such as state regu-
latory commissions and licensing boards—provided that these entities 
are acting pursuant to a delegation of authority from a governmental 
actor with independent, sovereign status. 
Id. 
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Therefore, any realistic hope for change must come through state 
legislation. 
D. The State Legislature Should Pass Assembly Bill A373 and Repeal 
New Jersey’s Rebate Ban 
At the state level, A373/S139,83 a bill co-sponsored by Assembly-
men Patrick Diegnan, Paul Moriarty, and Joseph Vas, and State Sena-
tor Nicolas Scutari,84 would repeal New Jersey’s rebate ban.85  The bill 
was discussed before the NJREC at five separate hearings held in 2007 
and 2008.86  According to Assemblyman Diegnan, A373 is designed to 
eliminate New Jersey’s ban on consumer rebates to help buyers re-
cover a portion of the commission, assisting them with their closing 
costs and making home buying more feasible.87  The Assemblyman 
explained that his own daughter’s real estate experience—one typical 
of the New Jersey middle class—helped drive him to sponsor this bill: 
My daughter is a teacher.  She makes about $50,000 a year.  She 
wants to buy herself a condo.  She has been able to save about 
20,000 for a deposit.  The closing costs are what are really killing 
her . . . . And I know . . . middle class young people today, are, 
 83 The Assembly version of the bill, A373, was first introduced in the Assembly as 
A3567 and referred to the Assembly’s Regulated Profession and Independent Au-
thorities Committee on Oct. 23, 2006.  New Jersey Legislature, http://www.njleg. 
state.nj.us/Default.asp (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (go to “Bill Search”; type “A373” in 
the “Bill Number(s)” query box; to see legislative history for A3567, click “A3567” 
hyperlink).  The bill was again introduced to the Assembly on Jan. 8, 2008 as A373 
and was referred to the Regulated Professions Committee.  Id.  On June 23, 2008, the 
bill was transferred to the Consumer Affairs Committee.  Id.  On Sept. 25, 2008, the 
bill was transferred back to the Regulated Professions Committee.  Id.  The Regu-
lated Professions Committee reported favorably on the bill with amendments on Jan. 
15, 2009.  Id.  The bill passed in the Assembly on Mar. 16, 2009 by a 45-26-7 vote.  Id.   
The Senate version of the bill, S139, was first introduced in the Senate as S2869 and 
referred to the Senate Commerce Committee on Nov. 8, 2007.  Id..  The bill was 
again introduced in the Senate on Jan. 8, 2008 as S139 and referred to the Com-
merce Committee.  Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Gen. Assem. 373, 213th Leg., 2008–2009 Leg. Sess. (N.J. 2008), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A0500/373_I1.PDF. 
 86 Presentation, supra note 47; April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66; Minutes of the 
meeting of the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Discussion Regarding Assembly Bill A-373-Rebate of 
Commissions/Zip Realty’s Request 2 (N.J. 2008) [hereinafter April 2008 Minutes]; Min-
utes of the meeting of the N. J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Discussion Regarding Assembly Bill A-
373-Rebate of Commissions/Zip Realty’s Request (CONTINUED) 5 (N.J. 2008); Draft Min-
utes of the meeting of the N.J. Real Estate Comm’n.: Discussion Regarding Assembly Bill A-373-
Rebate of Commissions/Zip Realty’s Request (CONTINUED) 6 (N.J. 2008). 
 87 April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66, at 2; Telephone Interview with Patrick Di-
egnan, Assem. and Sponsor of Assembly Bill 3567, Gen. Assem., in Newark, N.J.  
(Aug. 31, 2007). 
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many times, out of the housing market not because of [the] down 
payment, [but] because of closing costs.88 
Besides Assemblyman Diegnan, a number of individuals spoke 
on behalf of the legislation, such as the Senior Vice President of Pru-
dential Fox & Roach,89 the President of ZipRealty, the Executive Di-
rector of the Worldwide ERC Coalition, and attorneys from the 
DOJ.90  Even Commissioner Melillo of the NJREC provided an argu-
ment in favor of the rebate bill: “I think certainly, there’s [sic] a lot of 
seniors who unfortunately are looking to sell in New Jersey because 
they can’t afford the carrying costs anymore [and] could probably 
benefit from a rebate on the commissions.”91 
With estimates of potential cost savings for New Jersey’s consum-
ers ranging from $200 million92 to $596 million,93 the benefits of le-
galizing rebates are simply too great to ignore.  Therefore, the Senate 
should follow the Assembly’s lead and pass A373 and repeal New Jer-
sey’s rebate ban.94  Whatever limited consumer protection benefits 
 88 Presentation, supra note 47, at 41–42 (statement of Assem. Patrick Diegnan, 
Sponsor, Assem. Bill 3567 (currently A373)). 
 89 Ali, supra note 65, at 7 (“‘Our experience has been that it has been very posi-
tive for the consumer’ in Pennsylvania and Delaware, Constantino said. . . . ‘[F]rom 
our experience, it also empowers the consumer with more choices and gives them 
more flexibility without making them take their eyes off the ball.’”). 
 90 April 2007 Minutes, supra note 66, at 2. 
 91 Presentation, supra note 47, at 50–51 (statement of Comm’r Robert Melillo of 
the NJREC). 
 92 The Changing Real Estate Market: Hearing Before the Housing and Community Oppor-
tunity Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Financial Servs., 109th Cong. 5 (2006), available at 
http://financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/072506kgb.pdf (statement of Kim-
berly Gorsuch-Bradbury, Senior Vice President, Real Estate Networks LendingTree, 
LLC) (In 2005, “there were approximately 160,000 sales of existing homes in New 
Jersey, and the average sales price of these homes was approximately $365,000.  At 
that sales price, consumers using [LendingTree] could have each received a rebate 
of $1,250.  Therefore, the potential savings to New Jersey consumers . . . [was] nearly 
$200 million . . . .”). 
 93 Ali, supra note 65 (According to Bennett Matelson, an attorney with DOJ’s An-
titrust Division, “[i]f buyers had received [a] 1 percent rebate on the sale of all 
154,000 existing homes sold in New Jersey in 2006, buyers would have received over 
$596 million in cash[.]”). 
 94 Although the author supported A373 in its original form, he similarly supports 
the amendments to the bill made by the Assembly Regulated Professions Committee 
on Jan. 15, 2009.  Some of the most important amendments include 1) making re-
bates available only to buyers of residential real estate; 2) providing that only a real 
estate broker, as opposed to individual licensees, can provide rebates; 3) mandating 
that the broker and buyer memorialize the rebate at the beginning of the relation-
ship in a written contract; 4) requiring the broker to recommend to the buyer that 
he contact a tax professional to discuss any of the potential tax implications caused 
by the rebate; 5) requiring that the rebate only be in the form of a credit or check 
paid at closing; and 6) mandating that disclosure of the rebate be made to all parties 
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the rebate ban may provide do not outweigh the increased price 
competition and transaction cost savings that would be spurred by its 
repeal. 
IV. STEERING IS THE GREATEST IMPEDIMENT TO PRICE COMPETITION 
IN THE REAL ESTATE INDUSTRY AND NEW JERSEY MUST COMBAT IT 
MORE EFFECTIVELY 
The final and perhaps largest impediment to price competition 
in New Jersey is the anti-competitive practice of steering.95  Steering 
occurs when traditional brokers refuse to show, or navigate interested 
clients away from, the listings of alternative brokers because of the 
lower commission offered or the alternative brokerage’s business 
model.96  The effects of steering, and its efficiency in curtailing price 
competition because of the importance of cooperation in the resi-
dential real estate industry, have been widely discussed.97  Brokers are 
involved in the transaction.  ASSEM. REGULATED PROFESSIONS COMM., STATEMENT TO 
ASSEMBLY, NO. 373 WITH COMMITTEE AMENDMENTS, 213th Leg., 2008-2009 Leg. Sess., at 
1–2 (N.J. 2009), available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/2008/Bills/A0500/373_ 
S1.PDF (last visited Jan. 16, 2009). 
 95 Supra note 6. 
 96 The inter-dependant nature of the real estate industry means that steering can 
have profoundly negative effects on price competition: 
Commenters and participants in the real estate brokerage industry re-
port steering behavior  . . . .  An example of steering would be a coop-
erating broker purposely failing to show his or her client a home listed 
by a discount broker notwithstanding the fact that the home matches 
the buyer’s stated preferences.  Because listing brokers depend on coopera-
tion from rivals, brokers have an opportunity to deter discounting by steering 
buyers away from discounters’ listings.  Lack of cooperation will reduce the 
probability that homes listed by discounting brokers sell. 
FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 68 (emphasis added).  “[S]teering may also occur for rea-
sons having nothing to do with the attributes of the house. . . . They also may hold 
back from showing exclusive listings of those brokers (often alternative or ‘discount’ 
brokerage firms) who offer a less than attractive commission split.”  FTC 1983, supra 
note 5, at 75.   “These differentials in the potential incomes of brokers who are deal-
ing with prospective buyers appear to influence the showing patterns of such bro-
kers.  Brokers appear to steer buyers toward the house listed by the traditional, full 
commission broker.”  Id. at 39.  “Because traditional brokers working with buyers are 
usually compensated with a ‘split’ of the commission . . . the level of that split can 
and has influenced their interest in showing homes.  [T]here is much evidence that 
traditional brokers are reluctant, or refuse, to show homes with commission splits 
under 3 percent.”  WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 25, at 11. 
 97 FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 68.  “[T]he allegations . . .  appear to relate to . . . 
aspects of the industry which may tend to rigidify prices—the ability of other brokers in a 
community, because of the largely interdependent nature of the brokerage system, to withhold co-
operation and thereby single out for harm the business of a ‘maverick.’”  FTC/DOJ, supra 
note 3, at 22 (emphasis added); FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 36–37 (“Individual bro-
kers, we hypothesize, police the system by withholding cooperation in selling listings 
which carry a lower than customary ‘split’ or commission.  In doing so, they engage 
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able to engage in steering because “an MLS listing gives brokers in-
formation on the commission that will be paid to the broker who 
brings the buyer to that property.”98  According to the U.S. Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO), “[t]his practice potentially cre-
ates a disincentive for home sellers or their brokers to offer less than 
the prevailing rate, since buyers’ brokers may show high-commission 
properties first.”99  Numerous scholarly articles and government re-
ports discuss the MLS listing’s function as an aide in steering.100 
Steering also occurs when the commission offered to the buyer’s 
broker is equivalent to what a traditional brokerage would offer.  For 
example, although Realmart Realty, a flat-fee MLS access firm, typi-
cally offers a commission split to the buyer’s broker similar to what 
they expect from a traditional company—two to three percent—
Realmart still faces steering because of resistance to their business 
model.101  It therefore appears that brokers understand that if they 
both in typical profit-maximizing . . . and also prevent a collective lowering of com-
missions generally.”). 
Today broker A may represent a seller and broker B may represent a 
buyer; tomorrow the reverse may be true. This sell-side/buy-side re-
versible interaction provides a concrete means whereby agents who are 
the upholders of high fees can threaten to or actually discipline price-
cutting rivals, even in the absence of a [sic] MLS. A high-fee-upholding 
agent who has a potential buyer may threaten to or actually boycott the 
listings of a price-cutting seller’s agent.  Similarly, a high-fee-upholding 
agent with a listing may make it difficult for a fee-cutting agent to bring 
buyers to see the property.  Much of this “steering” can happen without 
any formal agreement among the agents to maintain high fee levels, 
especially in a social climate where the importance of maintaining high 
fees is frequently discussed and remarked upon in informal settings. 
White, supra note 25, at 6–7. 
 98 GAO, supra note 23, at 1. 
 99 Id. 
 100 Essentially, the MLS listing acts as a tool which competing brokers can use to 
help enforce a near-uniform commission rate and drive out discounters: 
MLS listings do show how much sellers’ brokers will pay other brokers 
for cooperating in a sale, according to industry participants.  When 
choosing among comparable homes for sale, brokers have a greater in-
centive—all else being equal—to first show prospective buyers homes 
that offer other brokers the prevailing commission rate than homes 
that offer a lower rate.  Therefore, even without formal policies to 
maintain uniform rates, individual brokers’ reliance on the coopera-
tion of other brokers to bring buyers to listed properties may help 
maintain a standard commission rate within a local area, at least for 
buyers’ brokers. 
GAO, supra note 23, at 13; see also Hahn, Litan & Gurman, supra note 62, at 96; Bruce 
M. Owen, Kickbacks, Specialization, Price Fixing, and Efficiency in Residential Real Estate 
Markets, 29 STAN. L. REV. 931, 948–49 (1977). 
 101 Ragusa Interview, supra note 34. 
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sell an alternative brokerage’s listing, they would be giving incentives 
to other sellers to list their homes with an alternative broker.  Thus, 
by avoiding alternative brokerages’ listings on the buyer side, tradi-
tional brokers are attempting to avoid price competition on the seller 
side.102 
Besides anecdotal evidence of steering’s existence, there is also 
quantitative support.  In the FTC’s much-cited 1983 report, its survey 
found that in their first year of operations, fifty-nine percent of re-
sponding alternative brokers suffered “frequent” refusals to show 
their listings by competing brokers, while ninety percent were faced 
with at least sporadic refusals.103  The discrimination also continued 
past the first year, as fifty percent of the alternative brokers continued 
to face “frequent” refusals after several years in the industry.104 
The effects of steering were made even clearer in New Jersey 
with the recent bankruptcy of Foxtons,105 a former leader in the New 
Jersey discount real estate market.106  Foxtons’s business model failed 
largely because traditional brokers steered clients away from Fox-
tons’s low commission listings.  As explained by a competing broker: 
“I predicted this would happen a year and change ago,” Marten 
said.  Marten said the fees Foxtons paid brokers—which she said 
at times was [sic] as low as 1 percent to 1 1/2 percent—did not 
entice independent brokers or brokers who worked for other 
agencies to show homes listed by Foxtons.  “I saw them finally go 
up to 2 percent, but their listings were languishing,” Marten said. 
“The broker was only going to get 1 or 2 percent. There wasn’t a 
lot of interest in showing their houses.”107 
 102 The fact that most brokerages serve both buyers and sellers further compli-
cates any effort to stifle steering: 
White noted any given broker operates on both the buyer and seller 
side of transactions and frequently interacts cooperatively with com-
petitors in these transactions. “This sell-side/buy-side reversible inter-
action provides a concrete means whereby agents who are upholders of 
high fees can threaten to or actually discipline price-cutting rivals, even 
in the absence of a [sic] MLS.” 
Hawker, supra note 7, at 19. 
 103 FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 75. 
 104 Id. at 75–76. 
 105 Diamond, supra note 32. 
 106 Foxtons had a major market share in New York and New Jersey, and at the time 
of their bankruptcy, they had 4400 listings in these two states.  Id. 
 107 James Bernstein, Foxtons May File for Bankruptcy, NEWSDAY, Sept. 27, 2007 
(online article on file with author).  A similar attitude towards Foxtons’ listings was 
displayed by a Montclair broker who claimed that she and other brokers were refus-
ing to show Foxtons’ listings because of their commission structure and business 
model. Glenn Roberts Jr., Realtors Slash Commission Splits With Discounter: Foxtons Com-
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A. Steering Raises Ethical and Legal Issues Because of its Negative 
Effect on Price Competition and Because It Directly Contravenes the 
Broker’s Fiduciary Duty 
The practice of steering raises both ethical and legal questions.  
Why should a broker not have the right to forgo dealing with a cer-
tain company because he believes his services are worth more than 
the commission offered?  The simple answer to the ethical aspect of 
this question is that through stifling price competition, steering in-
creases transaction costs and thereby hurts the consumer.  Steering 
also raises serious legal questions about the broker breaking his fidu-
ciary duties to his client. 
As to the issue of price competition, cooperation from fellow 
brokers is necessary for a real estate brokerage to have any success.108  
If brokers refuse to cooperate with an alternative brokerage and fail 
to show its listings, they may run that broker out of the market, and 
thus stymie potential price competition.109  This results in higher 
transaction costs for consumers.  Even the NJREC, which has taken a 
hands-off approach to steering,110 noted the importance of price 
competition in a 2005 advisory letter regarding discriminatory com-
mission splits:111 “Licensees may not discriminate or retaliate against a 
licensee who takes listings at lower commission rates . . . . Prohibiting 
retaliation against brokers who are taking listings at lower commis-
sion rates promotes competition, which results in lower commission 
fees to consumers.”112 
Perhaps even more importantly, those brokers who surrepti-
tiously engage in steering breach their fiduciary duties to their cli-
plains About Perceived Unfair Practices, INMAN NEWS, June 8, 2005 (online article on file 
with author). 
 108 GAO, supra note 23, at 13 (“A discount broker may advertise a lower commis-
sion rate to attract listings, but the broker’s success in selling those homes, and in at-
tracting additional listings . . . depends in part on other brokers’ willingness to coop-
erate (by showing the homes to prospective buyers) in the sale of those listings.”). 
 109 See generally Braswell & Poe, supra note 53, at 317 n.244 (“Evidence indicates 
that it is much easier for discount brokers to obtain property listings than it is for 
them to sell the properties (as compared to traditional brokers); this discrepancy has 
been attributed to the practice of steering by traditional brokers.”). 
 110 See infra note 149 and accompanying text. 
 111 For the regulation on discriminatory commission splits, see N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 
11:5-7.6 (2004). 
 112 Letter from The N.J. Real Estate Comm’n to all Real Estate Licensees, School 
Directors, Instructors and Other Interested Parties 1–2 (Nov. 29, 2005), available at 
http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/division_rec/recadvisory051130.pdf [hereinafter Let-
ter]. 
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ents.113  An agent is supposed to put the interests of his principal 
above all others, including his own.  As the Supreme Court of New 
Jersey has stated, “[t]he broker was and is looked upon as a fiduciary 
and is required to exercise fidelity, good faith and primary devotion to 
the interests of his principal.  He cannot permit his interests to interfere with 
those of his principal.”114  Brokers are in a unique position to influence 
the behavior of their clients, as they have the ability to “restrict[] the 
flow of information and thus reduce[] the consumer’s access to the 
market.”115  Therefore, “transactions that might interest the consumer 
may never come to the consumer’s attention.”116  By choosing not to 
show a home that otherwise meets the buyer’s needs simply because 
the broker believes the commission offered to him is too low, that 
broker is putting his own interests above those of his client, thereby 
breaching the fiduciary duty of loyalty.117  In that same vein, the 
NJREC’s language regarding discriminatory commission splits could 
easily be applied to steering: “any discriminatory action . . . may, in 
particular factual circumstances, also constitute a violation of a licen-
see’s fiduciary obligations to protect and promote the interests of his 
client.”118 
B. Enforcement of Breaches of the Broker’s Fiduciary Duty Will 
Effectively Stifle Steering  
The fiduciary relationship between a broker and his client de-
mands that a more effective campaign be waged against steering; but 
 113 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 61 n.299 (“Avoiding fee-for-service listings without 
disclosure to buyers, however, may raise issues concerning the fulfillment of fiduciary 
duties”). 
In some states, real estate agents collude to boycott homes that are be-
ing sold by agents who provide commission discounts. This practice is a 
clear breach of the fiduciary duty of the agent to find the best home at 
the lowest price for clients. Instead, the brokers are in effect finding 
homes for their clients that will afford them the highest fee structure. 
Editorial, The Realtor Racket, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A8. 
 114 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (citations omit-
ted) (emphasis added). 
 115 FTC 1983, supra note 5, at 75. 
 116 Id.  “Given the position of brokers as intermediaries between the buyers and 
the housing market, brokers can substantially influence the search behavior of the 
buyers.”  Id. at 38. 
 117 Such behavior would also appear to run afoul of the high ideals set forth in the 
Preamble of the REALTOR® Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, “The term 
REALTOR® has come to connote competency, fairness, and high integrity resulting 
from adherence to a lofty ideal of moral conduct in business relations.  No inducement 
of profit and no instruction from clients ever can justify departure from this ideal.” 
CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 67, at pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 118 Letter, supra note 112, at 2. 
MULLER (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:20:59 PM 
2009] COMMENT 687 
 
that is a difficult proposition.  Antitrust laws may be used, generally, 
when multiple groups of brokers collude to avoid showing alternative 
brokerages’ listings.119  A group boycott involves “‘concerted action 
with a purpose either to exclude a person or group from the market, 
or to accomplish some other anti-competitive object, or both.’”120  
That being said, proving collusion in the residential real estate indus-
try is highly difficult.121  Steering is a “particularly difficult behavior to 
root out [and] [b]ecause residential real estate sales generally re-
quire collaboration between competing firms, back-room deals aren’t 
necessary to artificially prop up prices.  [Instead,] [p]eer pressure 
and a modest grass-roots whisper campaign are generally enough to 
keep agents in line.”122  Because of this environment, it is very difficult 
to show that the brokers’ actions are part of a “concerted refusal to 
deal”123 rather than a non-actionable “unilateral refusal to deal.”124  
With group boycotts being hard to prove in the residential real estate 
industry, a unilateral refusal to deal could also be actionable under 
antitrust laws, but it would likely be an unsuccessful battle.125 
 119 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 69 (“It is well established that the antitrust laws 
prohibit an unreasonable agreement by a group of brokers that they will withhold 
cooperation from a particular broker.”). 
 120 Bruce D. Greenberg & Gary K. Wolinetz, 25 Years of New Jersey Antitrust, 26 
SETON HALL L. REV. 637, 650 (1996) (quoting Fuentes v. South Hills Cardiology, 946 
F.2d 196, 202 (3d Cir. 1991)). 
 121 See Hawker, supra note 7, at 19 (“[A] high-price agent can steer buyers away 
from properties listed by discounters, and this ‘can happen without any formal 
agreement among the agents to maintain high fee levels, especially in a social climate 
where the importance of maintaining high fees is frequently discussed and remarked 
upon in informal settings.’”). 
 122 Jon Birger, The 4 ½% Solution, MONEY, Oct. 1, 2004, available at http://money. 
cnn.com/magazines/moneymag/moneymag_archive/2004/10/01/8186561/index.
htm; see White, supra note 25, at 16–17. 
 123 Braswell & Poe, supra note 53, at 320 (stating that cases brought by alternative 
brokers against local boards of REALTORS® or MLS organizations have been unsuc-
cessful because the courts have concluded that the discriminatory treatment inflicted 
upon the alternative brokers was the result of the unilateral conduct of some broker-
ages, “rather than by a concerted refusal to deal”). 
 124 Erxleben, supra note 25, at 199 (“Even given the strong, interdependent cul-
ture of the industry and the history of reprisals against brokers who break industry 
competitive norms, a member broker’s avoidance of alternative brokers’ listings may still be 
characterized as an individual unilateral refusal to deal, rather than actionable concerted 
conduct.”) (emphasis added). 
 125 Proving that the offender had the necessary market power to sustain this type 
of cause of action would be near impossible in the residential real estate industry: 
Such a plaintiff could also bring an action against the MLS or the local 
board under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.  Under this section, an in-
dividual, unilateral refusal to deal may be grounds for an antitrust vio-
lation if the plaintiff can prove that the defendant has enough control 
in the market to conclude that it has monopoly power, and if the re-
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The group boycott requirement illuminates that antitrust laws 
generally become ineffective when unilateral decisions are made by 
individual brokers not to deal with an alternative brokerage.126  
Therefore, greater state action is needed to reduce the effects of 
steering.  That state action can be premised on the breach of fiduci-
ary duty which occurs when a broker surreptitiously steers his buyer 
away from a property that would otherwise be appropriate for the 
broker’s own self-interested reasons, such as the low commission of-
fered on the property or the desire not to work with an alternative 
broker.127 
C. Steering Is a Breach of the Broker’s Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and 
Disclosure 
The fiduciary duties of brokers in New Jersey are governed by 
code128 and case law.129  Four types of agency/non-agency relation-
ships are recognized in New Jersey: sellers’ agency, buyers’ agency, 
disclosed dual agency, and transaction brokerage.130  This Comment 
analyzes fiduciary duties in the context of buyers’ agency, as it is in 
this relationship that a broker who engages in steering breaches his 
duties of loyalty and disclosure to the buyer. 
fusal to deal is motivated by an intention to acquire or maintain mo-
nopoly power.  Very few recent cases based on this theory have been successful, 
however, because courts rarely have found adequate proof that the defendant 
possessed the requisite market power. 
Braswell & Poe, supra note 53, at 321 (emphasis added). 
 126 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 66–67 (“The antitrust laws generally do not require 
firms to cooperate with their competitors.”); see DAVID BARRY, NINE PILLARS OF THE 
CITADEL: A REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FED. TRADE COMM’N/U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
WORKSHOP ON COMPETITION POLICY AND THE REAL ESTATE INDUS. 57 (Nov. 2005) (cit-
ing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)), available at http://www. 
usdoj.gov/atr/public/workshops/rewcom/213351.pdf (explaining that, absent a 
group boycott, the Colgate doctrine allows individual brokers to choose not to deal 
with alternative brokerages without running afoul of antitrust laws). 
 127 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 61 n.299 (“Avoiding fee-for-service listings without 
disclosure to buyers, however, may raise issues concerning the fulfillment of fiduciary 
duties[.]”). 
 128 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.4(a) (2004) (“All licensees . . . shall strictly comply 
with the laws of agency and the principles governing fiduciary relationships. . . . 
[T]he licensee pledges himself to protect and promote, as he would his own, the interests of 
the client or principal . . . this obligation of absolute fidelity to the client’s or principal’s 
interest is primary . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 129 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (“The broker 
was and is looked upon as a fiduciary and is required to exercise fidelity, good faith 
and primary devotion to the interests of his principal.  He cannot permit his interests 
to interfere with those of his principal. . . . He must show perfect good faith and 
openness of dealing.”) (citations omitted). 
 130 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.9(h) (2004). 
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The New Jersey Administrative Code § 11:5-6.9(h) explains that 
the broker’s fiduciary duties to his buyer “include reasonable care, 
undivided loyalty, confidentiality and full disclosure.”131  Similar du-
ties are delineated both in the standard form “exclusive buyer 
agency” contract promulgated by NJAR®,132 and within the NAR 
Code of Ethics and Standards of Practi
Steering is a breach of the broker’s fiduciary duties of “undi-
vided loyalty” and “full disclosure” to the buyer,134 and a breach of the 
duty “to protect and promote, as he would his own, the interests of 
the client or principal he has undertaken to represent.”135  By engag-
ing in steering, a broker may also be breaching the duties set forth in 
the aforementioned exclusive buyer agency contract, which states 
that the buyer’s agent shall “represent [b]uyer’s best interests.”136 
The duty of loyalty requires the subordination of the broker’s 
personal interests to those of the client.137  To comply with that duty, 
the broker must make the client aware of all homes that are within 
the client’s price range and that meet the specific requirements set 
forth by the client—such as neighborhood, number of bedrooms, lot 
size, and other metrics—regardless of the identity of the listing bro-
ker.  If, without disclosing,138 a broker fails to show the client a prop-
erty which meets the client’s needs simply because of the broker’s 
own self-interest—the potential for earning a larger commission by 
selling a different home—the broker is breaching the duty of loyalty 
by putting his own interests above those of his client.  Also, when a 
broker surreptitiously engages in steering without disclosing his ac-
tions to his client, he is in breach of his duty of full disclosure. 
 131 Id. 
 132 NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, STANDARD FORM OF EXCLUSIVE BUYER 
AGENCY AGREEMENT (2001). 
 133 CODE OF ETHICS, supra note 67, at Duties to Clients and Customers Art. I 
(“When representing a buyer . . . REALTORS® pledge themselves to protect and pro-
mote the interests of their client.  This obligation to the client is primary . . . .”). 
 134 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.9(h) (2004). 
 135 Id. § 11:5-6.4(a). 
 136 NEW JERSEY ASSOCIATION OF REALTORS®, supra note 132. 
 137 Ellsworth Dobbs, Inc. v. Johnson, 236 A.2d 843, 856 (N.J. 1967) (“The broker  
. . . is required to exercise . . . primary devotion to the interests of his principal.  He 
cannot permit his interests to interfere with those of his principal.”) (citations omit-
ted). 
 138 On the other hand, if the broker discloses his desire not to show the listings of 
an alternative broker to his client, and the client agrees to the practice, then there is 
no breach of fiduciary duty.  For example, a New Jersey broker informed her clients 
that she would not be showing them homes listed by Foxtons because she disap-
proved of its business model, leaving them the option of viewing the Foxtons listings 
with another broker.  Roberts, supra note 107. 
MULLER (FINAL) 4/6/2009  11:20:59 PM 
690 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:665 
 
D. A Multi-Faceted Approach Is Needed to Combat Steering, Including 
Increasing Consumer Awareness and Expanding Regulatory 
Enforcement 
Tackling the problem of steering in New Jersey requires a multi-
faceted approach.  The first goal must be to better inform the con-
sumer of the existence of steering and the ways it can be combated.  
This is achievable through some relatively minor code changes and a 
public awareness campaign.  First, information on steering must be 
imparted to buyers before they begin the home search with their 
broker.  Buyers should be encouraged to research available homes—
by using the internet139 and visiting desired neighborhoods—prior to 
hiring a broker.  This message could be disseminated to prospective 
buyers through limited advertising in real estate publications and a 
public awareness campaign, consisting of editorial letters to local 
newspapers and appearances on local television programming.140  
Reaching buyers before they meet with a broker is of particular im-
portance because when buyers perform research in preparation for 
their visit with a broker, they reduce their reliance on the broker’s 
superior knowledge of the inventory of available homes.141  Using this 
approach, a buyer will go into a brokerage knowing which specific 
homes he wants to visit, making it more difficult for the broker to en-
gage in steering.142 
 139 For the effects of the internet on the residential real estate industry and steer-
ing, see FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 70 (“Going forward, the Internet offers consum-
ers increased knowledge of homes available for sale and, consequently, may limit the 
ability of cooperating brokers to steer buyers away from desirable homes listed by 
discount and fee-for-service brokers.”); Hawker, supra note 7, at 16–17 (“[A]ccess to 
MLS data over the Internet is shifting more of the search function to buyers as well as 
making buyers and sellers ‘more knowledgeable about local comparisons with price, 
location, schools, etc.’”). 
 140 The NJREC’s Executive Director, Assistant Director, or President of the Real 
Estate Commissioners should author the editorial letters.  The television appearances 
could also be made by one or more of these individuals.  See generally N.J. ADMIN. 
CODE § 11:5-1.3 (2004) (organization chart for the NJREC).  That being said, since 
the functions of the NJREC as described in section 11:5-1.3 do not include public 
awareness campaigns, this may be best accomplished through a joint project done in 
conjunction with the Office of the Attorney General, Division of Consumer Affairs.  
New Jersey Division of Consumer Affairs, http://www.state.nj.us/lps/ca/home.htm 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 141 FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 27 (“[B]rokers can take advantage of their superior 
knowledge of market conditions by steering clients away from home listings that oth-
erwise match the criteria identified by the consumers, but provide lower financial 
gains for the broker than other homes.”). 
 142 See FTC/DOJ, supra note 3, at 28 (“[B]uyers’ increasing use of the Internet 
may limit brokers’ ability to steer buyers away from discounters’ listings without their 
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The informational approach to increased consumer awareness 
should continue when buyers enter a broker’s office.  A “Warning 
Signs of Steering” poster—similar to the Fair Housing poster that is 
currently required143—should be mandated for the walls of every bro-
kerage.144  Also, a description of steering should be included in the 
Consumer Information Statement—a pamphlet which is required to 
be shown to clients before the agency relationship begins.145  Finally, 
buyers should again be made aware of steering before they submit an 
offer on a home by requiring that brokers provide a steering memo-
randum to buyers at contract-signing, similar to the required Attor-
ney General’s memorandum on the Law Against Discrimination.146  
The broker should be required to have the client read the memoran-
dum prior to signing the contract. 
Another component of the informational approach should be to 
attempt to stop steering at its source by making a discussion on steer-
ing a mandatory component of the real estate salesperson training 
course and the broker training course.147  For those salespersons and 
knowledge. . . . If a [buyer] finds a discounter’s listing . . . a broker likely will either 
have to show the [buyer] the discounter’s listing or explain why he or she will not.”). 
 143 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 13:8-1.3 (2004); EDITH LANK & JOAN M. SOBECK, ESSENTIALS 
OF NEW JERSEY REAL ESTATE 56 (9th ed. 2006). 
 144 That poster should provide a brief, clear definition of steering, a suggestion 
that buyers do their own research of the available homes within the desired commu-
nity, and the recommendation that buyers ask their broker whether they are being 
shown all of the homes that meet their specifications.  The poster should conclude 
with an instruction that buyers should report steering behavior to the NJREC.  Part 
of the text could read: 
WARNING: Are you being shown all available homes?  Some brokers 
engage in a practice called steering, where they fail to show buyers 
homes that meet their needs because the compensation being offered 
by the seller’s broker is lower than the standard rate.  Make sure you do 
not fall victim to this practice.  Research the homes available in your 
desired neighborhood through internet searches and visits to the area.  
Ask your broker whether you are being shown all available homes that 
meet your specifications.  An informed buyer will be a satisfied home-
owner. 
 145 N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.9(e)(1)(i) (2004).  The steering description in the 
Consumer Information Statement could echo the text of the “Warning Signs of 
Steering” poster.  Supra note 144. 
 146 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1 (West 2002); N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-6.4(j) (2004).  
The memorandum should contain a text similar to the “Warning Signs of Steering” 
poster (described in note 144), and should also say that steering is a breach of the 
broker’s fiduciary duty to the buyer, and that such behavior should be reported to 
the NJREC.  See supra note 144. 
 147 For the required subject matter of the salesperson and broker courses, see N.J. 
ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-2.1(f),(g) (2004).  The Code currently requires that twelve of the 
seventy five hour salesperson’s course be devoted to “[t]he laws of agency[.]”  Id. § 
11:5-2.1(f).  This Comment suggests that a mandatory requirement of at least a one 
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brokers that are already licensed, the NJREC should draft and dis-
seminate an advisory letter describing steering, its negative effects on 
both consumers and competition within the industry, how it is a 
breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the buyer, and how the NJREC 
will vigorously investigate and punish those licensees who engage in 
the practice. 
Finally, breaches of the broker’s fiduciary duty must be en-
forced.  In New Jersey, there has been a lack of state action in enforc-
ing the broker’s fiduciary duty in relation to steering.  The NJREC’s 
website indicates few recent enforcement actions based on § 11:5-
6.4,148 none of which relate to steering.149  This lack of regulatory en-
forcement is not limited to New Jersey, and was cited in a Wall Street 
Journal editorial which said that “[t]o our knowledge, neither the Na-
tional Association of Realtors nor the state real estate commissions 
have ever sanctioned a real estate agent for [anti-competitive behav-
ior].”150  This is unacceptable. 
The NJREC must take a proactive approach to combating steer-
ing.151  Because the NJREC has investigative powers,152 one method 
hour discussion on steering and how it is a breach of the salesperson’s fiduciary du-
ties be included within the twelve hour agency discussion requirement.  Similarly, for 
the broker course, this Comment suggests at least a one hour discussion on steering 
be included within the thirty hour course on ethics and agency law, particularly 
within the section of the course that deals with “[t]he fiduciary duties owed by agents 
to their principals.”  Id. § 11:5-2.1(g)(6)(i). 
 148 See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 149 NJ Real Estate Commission—Disciplinary Actions, http://www.state.nj.us/dobi 
/division_rec/recdiscp.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2008) (since 1999, only twenty-four 
actions have been based on section 11:5-6.4 and none appear related to steering). 
 150 Editorial, The Realtor Racket, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2005, at A8 (cited in 
WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 25, at 16). 
 151 Woodall and Brobeck similarly call for greater action by state regulators to “in-
tervene fairly in cases of anti-competitive actions against nontraditional brokers[.]”  
WOODALL & BROBECK, supra note 25, at 18.  One clear explanation for why the NJREC 
has not taken greater steps to stop steering is that the majority of its members are 
themselves brokers.  See About the Real Estate Commission, http://www.state.nj.us/ 
dobi/division_rec/reabout.html#REHearingsCommMembers (last visited Nov. 5, 
2008).  Woodall and Brobeck have shown that state regulators throughout the coun-
try, on the whole, have been very unsupportive of alternative brokerages.  WOODALL 
& BROBECK, supra note 25, at 16–17.   While this author believes that the NJREC 
would act against steering if it was given more resources and enough pressure was 
applied on it by the public, the federal government, and the other two branches of 
New Jersey’s state government, others may wish to read Nine Pillars of the Citadel, 
which advocates for a more aggressive approach to ending steering: federal creation 
of a national MLS system which fully exposes commission information to buyers and 
sellers.  Barry, supra note 126, at 63. 
 152 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-16.41(f) (West Supp. 2007) (“The commission may . . . 
[m]ake any necessary public or private investigations within or outside of this State to 
determine whether any person has violated or is about to violate any provision of this 
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that could be effective is to begin random steering inspections.  Such 
a program could be similar to the Fair Housing inspections that are 
currently performed in New Jersey by the Division on Civil Rights153 
and private enforcement groups,154 in which testers are utilized to see 
if brokerages are complying with Fair Housing laws.155  In these steer-
ing inspections, the NJREC could use investigators posing as prospec-
tive buyers to see if brokers are steering buyers away from alternative 
brokerages’ listings despite their instructions to see all available 
homes in a specific price range or area of town.  Finally, to add some 
teeth to its enforcement measures, the NJREC should use the breach 
of the broker’s fiduciary duty as a rationale for fining, suspending, or 
revoking the licenses of those brokers that engage in steering.156 
V. CONCLUSION 
New Jersey needs an increased level of price competition among 
brokers to reduce transaction costs associated with buying and selling 
a home.  The best way to achieve price competition is through chang-
ing the legal and regulatory environment to encourage the growth of 
alternative brokerages.  Three changes are necessary to accomplish 
this goal.  First, the Legislature must pass A373 and legalize consumer 
rebates.  Second, the NJREC should adopt a number of new measures 
act, or to aid in the enforcement of this act or in the prescribing of rules and regula-
tions and forms hereunder”); see id. § 45:15-17 (further describing the extent of the 
NJREC’s investigative powers); see also N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 11:5-1.1 (2004) (“The Real 
Estate Commission is responsible for . . . the investigation and adjudication of disci-
plinary actions against licensees . . . .”). 
 153 Some examples of New Jersey Law Against Discrimination actions where testers 
took part include: Press Release, N.J. Dep’t of Law & Public Safety, Division on Civil 
Rights Files Housing Discrimination Complaints (June 23, 2003), http://nj.gov/lps/ 
newsreleases03/pr20030623a.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008); Press Release, N.J. 
Dep’t of Law & Public Safety, Attorney General Announces Findings of Probable 
Cause in Housing Case (Feb. 15, 2007), http://www.nj.gov/oag/newsreleases07/ 
pr20070215a.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2008). 
 154 Fair Housing Council of Northern New Jersey, http://www.fhcnnj.org/ 
index.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2008). 
 155 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that testers have standing.  
Public Law Research Institute, Investigatory Testing as a Tool for Enforcing Civil 
Rights Statutes, http://w3.uchastings.edu/plri/spring98/testing.html (citing Havens 
Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982)) (last visited Nov. 5, 2008).  Similarly, 
“tester” standing is allowed in the New Jersey courts.  T.L. v. Toys R Us, Inc., 605 A.2d 
1125, 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992) (Skillman, J.A.D., dissenting) (“For ex-
ample, in Polk v. Cherry Hill Apartments, Inc. . . . we held that black ‘testers’ could pur-
sue a claim for unlawful discrimination in the rental of apartments even though 
they had no actual intent to rent an apartment.”) (citation omitted).  See generally  
LANK & SOBECK, supra note 143, at 62. 
 156 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 45:15-17 (West Supp. 2007) (provides the punishment that 
the NJREC may levy against a broker). 
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to increase consumer awareness of the anti-competitive practice of 
steering.  Third, the NJREC needs to proactively investigate steering 
and punish those brokers who behave anti-competitively.  If New Jer-
sey adopts this framework, the increased price competition sparked 
by the changes would allow home buyers and sellers across the state 
to save substantial amounts on commission costs. 
